Self Judgments

Knowledge of when one is doing well or poorly — when to continue and when to throw in the towel — is exceedingly important. The confidence one holds, however, all too rarely matches what is merited. While the severity of this problem differs across people and domains, beliefs about one’s ability and the quality of one’s performances often have little basis in reality. As a result, those who are underconfident often rob themselves of valuable opportunities. Overconfident individuals, by contrast, often persist even when they lack the requisite skills. My work offers insight into the sources of over and underconfidence by identifying factors that lead self-judgments astray.

Projects
How Level of Skill Contributes to Error in Self-Judgments

Having an accurate impression of the quality of one’s own performance requires an understanding of what a good performance looks like. Those who lack skill in intellectual tasks, however, often lack the knowledge necessary to recognize their lack of skill. I have demonstrated that those who lack skill also lack insight into their poor performances, even on well-known real world tasks (e.g. long term gun owners evaluating their knowledge of gun use and safety) and in the presence of strong incentives to be accurate (Ehrlinger, 2008; Ehrlinger, et al, 2008). My work also explores the other side of the skill level spectrum. I find that those who possess great skill are uniquely aware of the ways in which they can still improve and this awareness tends depress confidence and increase anxiety, leaving highly skilled individuals underconfident in their abilities (Ehrlinger, Research In Progress). In two large scale studies, I am currently exploring the relationships between confidence, approach towards studying and level of skill in academic contexts (Eccles, Ward, Woodman, Janelle, Le Scanff, Ehrlinger, Castanier, & Coombes, Under Review; Ehrlinger & Ward, Research In Progress; Ward & Ehrlinger, Research In Progress).

Theories of Change and Self Judgments

Theories of Change and Attention Allocation: I have found that beliefs regarding the modifiability of intelligence impacts both allocation of attention and confidence for intellectual tasks (Ehrlinger, et al, Manuscript in Preparation). Those who believe intelligence is fixed and unchangeable (entity or fixed theorists) feel particularly threatened by failure. As a result, they shift their attention away from hard aspects of the task that suggest they might be failing. Instead, fixed theorists allocate their attention towards easier aspects of the task that suggest success and, consequently, are left with an overconfident impression of how well they have performed. In contrast, those who believe intelligence is changeable (incremental or growth theorists) are motivated to learn and feel less threatened by failure. As such, they allocate their attention in more even-handed ways and make more accurate assessments of their test performance. More recently, I have started to explore the consequences of accuracy and overconfidence. I argue that growth theorists’ willingness to set their ego aside and learn about their weaknesses helps them direct study and practice efforts towards where they are most needed. Indeed, I show that growth theorists are more likely than fixed theorists to report monitoring their level of understanding and actively focusing on comprehending difficult concepts (Ehrlinger & Ward, Research In Progress). Over time, I expect this focus to lead to better learning and performance.

Theories of Change for Memory and Weight Loss: Although the bulk of past research on theories of change has focused on beliefs about intelligence, researchers have replicated and extended this research to other domains, including theories regarding personality and morality. I have recently modified the theories of intelligence scale to measure theories about memory. Memory tends to decline with age but one can reduce the speed of decline by using strategies to improve memory skill. My research suggests that those who believe that they can improve their memory are more likely to take advantage of an available memory tutorial and, consequently, perform better on later tests of memory (Ehrlinger, Conlon & Kelley, Research In Progress). I have also modified the theories scale to measure beliefs regarding whether fitness level is changeable. Preliminary evidence suggests those who believe that fitness is changeable (e.g., through changes in diet and exercise) adhere more closely to a weight loss program than those who believe fitness level is relatively fixed (e.g., genetics, Ehrlinger, et al, Research In Progress).

Changing Theories of Change: I have also explored how motivation influences people’s theories of change. To date, research on how theories of change develop has been limited to the effects of different types of parental feedback. My work shows how experiences with success and failure also shape theories of change in motivated ways. Experiences of success might lead one to hold a more fixed theory in order to preserve that experience by attributing the success to a stable trait. In contrast, experiences of failure in important domains are likely to inspire motivated beliefs in the ability to improve. Indeed, my research shows that individuals report higher beliefs in the fixed nature of relevant traits after experiencing success in an important domain but are more likely to describe relevant traits as malleable after experiencing failure (Ehrlinger, Manuscript in Preparation). I am currently exploring a conceptual replication and extension of this work that explores a second way to preserve self-esteem by modifying theories of change. For important domains, one can preserve self-esteem after failure by adopting a belief in the possibility of improvement as in the above studies. For domains that are less important, however, one can adopt a view that the domain is unimportant and derive self-esteem from other, more successful domains. I am currently measuring the perceived importance of weight loss goals and beliefs regarding changeability in fitness level in a l2-week longitudinal weight loss study.  For those who maintain the importance of their weight loss goal, I expect a strong belief in the power of lifestyle choices to improve fitness level. However, I expect others to report that their weight loss goals are less and less important as the weeks go by and they fail to lose weight. I expect this group to preserve self-esteem by attributing their current level of fitness to genetics and defining themselves in terms qualities unrelated to appearance and fitness (Ehrlinger, et al, Research In Progress).

Goal Focus and Self and Social Judgment

Since arriving at FSU, I have continued a line of research exploring how differential perception of current progress towards group goals stem from differences in the reference points adopted. In collaboration with Richard Eibach, I have shown that those for whom a goal has direct relevance (e.g. women’s perspective on progress towards gender equality) tend to keep their “eyes on the prize.” This focus on distal goals highlights what is left to achieve and results in less positive perceptions of current progress, relative to those focused on how far we have come (Eibach and Ehrlinger, Under Review). 
Since arriving at FSU, I have extended this work to the domain of personal goals. Fishbach & colleagues have recently demonstrated benefits of focusing on one’s goals for motivation. I argue, however, that this analysis in incomplete. In order to truly succeed, it is important to focus on one’s goals and determine how to reach them. This focus makes salient what one has yet to accomplish and increases motivation for those committed to their goals, at least in the short-term. However, I show that this salience can also lead to lowered confidence and greater anxiety about one’s current level of knowledge and progress. Over time, the lack of confidence that accompanies focusing on what one has to accomplish might undermine motivation in the long run. In contrast, focusing on what one has already accomplished can lead individuals to feel that they are well on their way to achieving their goal. I have demonstrated this pattern of confidence with respect to focus on goals to perform well on final exams and to succeed in a desired career (Ehrlinger & Eibach, Manuscript in Preparation). Currently, I am conducting a longitudinal study to explore the impact of goal versus accomplishment on a weight loss goal. Preliminary data analyses show, as predicted, that participants focused on what they still have to do display greater commitment and motivation at the start of a weight loss program but feel less satisfied with their current level of progress (Ehrlinger, et al, Research in Progress) I predict that this lack of satisfaction will, over the course of the study, undermine motivation and lead to less persistence and success in losing weight.

Discrepancies between Self and Social Judgments

Although my work often focuses on the processes underlying overconfidence, I am also fascinated by the problem of underconfidence. In particular, I have explored how underconfidence and related factors can make women reticent to pursue male-dominated careers. Past research shows that the discrepancies between self perceptions and perceptions of prototypical individuals can be an important predictor of choice. My research shows that a large gap between women’s self perceptions and perceptions of the prototypical computer scientist predicts their relative lack of interest in pursuing computer science (Ehrlinger, Manuscript in Preparation). Not surprisingly, this gap stems partly from a tendency for men and women to differ in self judgments. More interesting, however, is that men and women also differ in their perception of prototypical members of fields such as computer science and this difference exacerbates the apparent discrepancy for women between the self and the prototype. For example, women’s self-ratings of intelligence are lower than those provided by men but also women’s ratings of the prototypical computer scientist’s intelligence is higher than the ratings provided by men. Thus, even if women did not differ from men in perceptions of the self, they might be less likely to pursue male-dominated careers than men because women hold more extreme perceptions of prototypical members of those fields. I am currently writing a NSF grant application based on preliminary evidence that women’s feelings of dissimilarity to prototypical scientists leads to lowered feelings of belongingness in science, relative to men. This difference in feelings of belongingness is particularly troubling because, we show, feelings of belongingness are more predictive of pursuit of science courses and careers for women than for men (Ehrlinger, Plant & Conlon, Research In Progress).

How Strategies for Assessing Bias Introduce Error into Self-Judgments

My fascination with the difficult task of knowing oneself well is based, in part, on the surprising level of confidence individuals hold in their self-views. This fascination leads naturally to an interest in a related question — do individuals recognize when their judgment might be clouded? One might think that holding a “vested interest” in an issue is the sort of bias that one cannot deny. However, I have shown that people believe their own connection to an issue to be a source of enlightenment, but the connection of others to be a source of bias (Ehrlinger, Gilovich, & Ross, 2005). For example, Jewish participants thought their own views were less influenced by personal connection to the issue of violence in the Middle East than the views of Muslim and Arab participants. Muslim and Arab participants, in contrast, judged their own connection to the issue to be a source of enlightened information, but the personal connection held by Jewish participants to be a source of bias. In this way, a personal stake is only seen as a source of bias when it is held by others, allowing individuals to believe that their own judgments are objective.